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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ARBRA JOHNSON, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
MERRILL D. JOHNSON, 
Defendant/Appellant 
CASE NO. 96057-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER, JUDGE 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT: 
"Tr." refers to the transcript of the proceedings of the trial 
of this case, "R" refers to the Record on Appeal, and "Ex." refers 
to exhibits received into evidence by the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION: 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to 
the provisions of Sections 3 and 5, Article VIII of the Utah 
Constitution, and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARDS FOR REVIEW: 
ISSUE ONE: 
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANTING 
A MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.(R. 259-262) 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: 
a. On appeal the appellate court must review the facts in the 
light most favorable to the prevailing party. Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 
P2d 530 (Utah, 1979). 
b. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is without 
adequate evidentiary foundation or if it is induced by an erroneous 
view of the law. Cove View Excavating & Const, v. Flynn, 758 P2d 
474 (Utah, 1988). 
c. In reviewing the trial court's findings, the clearly 
erroneous standard is applied. Bell v. Elder. 782 P2d 545 (Utah, 
1990) . 
d. Conclusions of Law are reviewed on appeal for correctness 
without any deference to the trial court. Cove View Excavating & 
Const, v. Flynn. supra. 
ISSUE TWO: 
EVEN IF THERE WAS A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES THE 
FACTS DO NOT WARRANT A MODIFICATION OF THE DECREE AS A MATTER OF 
EQUITY.(R. 259-262) 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: 
See the standards of review for Issue One above. 
ISSUE THREE: 
THE ATTORNEYS FEES AWARDED TO MRS. JOHNSON WERE FAIR AND 
REASONABLE.(R. 259-262) 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: 
See the standards of review for Issue One above. 
ISSUE FOUR: 
THERE WAS NO CONTRACT CREATED BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO REDUCE OR 
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ELIMINATE THE ALIMONY AWARD TO MRS. JOHNSON.(R. 259-262) 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW: 
See the standards of review for Issue One above. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(A) Nature of the Case: 
The parties were divorced in 1990 after a marriage of 24 years 
by the Third District Court. Mrs. Johnson was awarded alimony as 
well as child support for the two children who were still minors. 
The Decree of Divorce was later modified to increase the alimony to 
$550.00 per month. Mr. Johnson subsequently filed a petition to 
modify the Decree to eliminate the alimony on the grounds that (a) 
the parties had entered into a binding agreement to eliminate the 
alimony and (b) there had been a substantial change in 
circumstances warranting the elimination of the alimony. There 
were additional issues concerning arrearages but these were 
resolved by stipulation and are not issues in this appeal. 
Mrs. Johnson filed a Counterclaim asking that the alimony be 
increased and that Mr. Johnson be ordered to provide her with 
assistance in making repairs to the family home. 
(B) Course of Proceedings: 
A trial was held by the Third District Court, the honorable 
Sandra Peuler presiding, on the 12th day of June, 1996 after the 
parties were unable to reach a settlement of the issues. 
(C) Disposition in Lower Court: 
The District Court found that there had been no substantial 
change in circumstances warranting a modification of the Decree for 
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either party. Thus the position of the parties remained unchanged 
and the alimony amount remained the same. The court also found 
that even if there were a substantial change the facts did not 
warrant a modification based upon the facts and as a matter of 
equity. (R. 258) 
The court granted Mrs. Johnson judgments for back alimony and 
attorney's fees and permitted Mr. Johnson to make monthly payments 
on those amounts. (R. 258) Mr. Johnson then appealed the court's 
decision. (R. 269) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Arbra Johnson and Merrill Johnson were married to each 
other on May 7, 1966 in Salt Lake City. (R. 1) 
2. Mrs. Johnson filed for divorce in November of 1989. (R. 1) 
A trial was held before the honorable Richard H. Moffat on the 18th 
of October, 1990, and the marriage was dissolved by a Decree of 
Divorce which became final on the 21st of December, 1990. (R. 132) 
3. During the course of the marriage the parties had three 
children/ two of which were still minors at the time the Decree was 
entered. (R. 125) 
4. In its Findings of Fact at the time of the original trial, 
the District Court found that Mr. Johnson's average monthly income 
was $3,100.00. (R. 125) 
5. Those same findings found that the average monthly income 
of Mrs. Johnson was $110.00. (R. 126) 
6. The court also found that Mrs. Johnson was in need of 
alimony and ordered Mr. Johnson to pay to her the sum of $350.00 
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per month, with that sum to increase to $550.00 per month when the 
second youngest child attained her majority. (R. 127) 
i . The court found that the real property of the parties had 
a fair market value of $52,000.00, and that Mr. Johnson was 
entitled to a line of $8,500.00, (R. 128) , which sum was to be paid 
when the youngest child reached 18 (R. 129), or one of the other 
usual contingencies. None of the contingencies have occurred as 
yet in this case. 
8. At the original trial the court made the following finding: 
"It is the intent of the court that when Plaintiff has 
obtained a college degree (other than an associate degree), 
that Defendant should have the right at that time to 
petition the court to review the issue of alimony 
for the purpose of determining whether alimony should be 
terminated or substantially reduced. To that end, 
alimony shall continue for four (4) years. At the end 
of the four-year period Defendant shall have the right to 
petition the Court for the purpose of determining whether 
alimony should be reduced or terminated. If at any time 
during the four-year period, Plaintiff does not maintain 
enrollment as a full-time student, Defendant shall 
have the right to petition this Court in regards to 
reducing or terminating alimony. [Last portion of paragraph 
13] (R. 127) 
9. Essentially the same wording was embodied in the Decree of 
Divorce. (R. 134) 
10. Both of the parties are 50 years of age. (R. 189; R. 238) 
11. Mr. Johnson is employed as a sales representative by Time 
Distributors. (R. 238) He testified that he earns between 
$3,500.00 and $4,000.00 per month. (Tr. 62) 
12. The District Court's finding at the trial in this matter 
was that he earned $3,800.00 per month. (R. 260) This was based 
upon his 1994 Federal Income Tax Return (Ex. P-5) and his testimony 
that his income for 1995 had been the same as it had been in 1994. 
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(Tr. 78) 
12. Mrs. Johnson is employed as a Human Resources Assistance 
for the L.D.S. Church, and earns a gross monthly salary of 
$1,573.00. (Tr. 20) 
13. At the time of the divorce she had begun operating a 
beauty salon out of her home; the District Court found that she 
earned $110.00 per month from its operation. (Tr. 12; R. 126) She 
has continued to operate that salon and currently earns 
approximately $200.00 per month. (Tr. 23) 
14. Mrs. Johnson's net income from her employment with the 
L.D.S. Church is only $493.04 every two weeks, or approximately 
$1,083.82 per month. (Ex. P-7; R. 259) 
15. She receives $294.00 per month from child support for the 
one child living in the home. (R. 259) 
16. Mr. Johnson's net income each month is $2,600.00 and his 
expenses, including his child support obligation, total $2,083.00 
per month. (R. 260; R. 240; Ex. D-10) The net figure for Mr. 
Johnson is derived by the court from his financial declaration and 
Exhibit D-10 submitted by him. That exhibit totals the above 
amount from the line after taxes paid, thus providing his actual 
net figure. (See Tr. 69) 
17. Mr. Johnson lives with a woman by the name of Dialyn 
Meyers, who is employed at the University of Utah. (Tr. 79) 
18. Mr. Johnson testified that the only thing she paid towards 
the household expenses was to buy some of the food. (Tr. 80) 
19. Mr. Johnson owns a motorhome, lives in condominium, 
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dresses well, takes trips, and recently took a trip to Hawaii. 
(Tr. 81) 
20. Mr. Johnson testified that he paid for all of the rent, 
all utilities and most of the other living expenses for both 
himself and the lady with who he lives and that contributes nothing 
except some of the food purchases. (Tr. 81) 
21. The woman with whom he lives has no children. (Tr. 81) 
22. Mrs. Johnson's adjusted gross income on her 1995 Federal 
Income Tax return was $19,201.00 (Ex. P-6) 
23. Mr. Johnson's income before alimony on his 1994 Federal 
Income Tax return was $47,586.00. (Ex. P-5) . 
24. Mr. Johnson's total income for 1990, the year he was 
divorced, was $60,478.00. (Ex. P-2) This was the year that his 
projected income was to only be a gross of $3,100.00. (R. 125-126) 
25. Mr. Johnson has had sufficient income to put money into an 
IRA account every year since the divorce, including the year of the 
divorce. (Ex. P-2; Ex. P-2) 
26. In March of 1995 Mr. Johnson telephoned Mrs. Johnson and 
asked if asked if she was going to continue asking for alimony now 
that she was employed. (Tr. 34) Mr. Johnson was very agitated and 
the conversation degenerated into a somewhat one-sided argument. 
(Tr. 34) He also made threats and used intimidation to try and get 
her to agree to a reduction in alimony. (Tr. 92) 
27. Mrs. Johnson told him during the conversation that she 
felt the alimony was necessary income for her and the minor child 
and that she would not agree to terminate the alimony. (Tr. 36) 
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Mrs. Johnson summarized the conversation in a writing immediately 
after the conversation, the contents of which are set forth in the 
writing marked and received as Exhibit P-9. (Tr. 34) 
28. A conversation was had around this same time between 
counsel for Mr. Johnson and Mrs. Johnson. Mrs. Johnson did not 
agree to terminate alimony in her conversations with counsel. (Tr. 
36) She testified that she had no incentive to terminate, that she 
needed the money to live on. (Tr. 37) 
29. She testified that she received no consideration from Mr. 
Johnson to alter or terminate the alimony obligation, except that 
through his attorney an offer of one lump sum payment of $1,000.00 
was made to her to terminate the alimony. She refused. (Tr. 37, 
94) 
30. There were efforts between counsel for Mr. Johnson, Mr. 
Johnson and Mrs. Johnson in late 1994 about changing the alimony to 
$170.00 per month for five years but no agreement was ever reached. 
(Tr. 17-20) 
31. The minor child turns 18 in May of 1997, at which time 
Mrs. Johnson will lose the income from the child support. (Tr. 32) 
32. During the four years that Mrs. Johnson worked on her 
degree from the University of Utah she paid for all of the books 
and tuition, with some help from State rehab and some through a 
Pell grant. (Tr. 29) Mr. Johnson paid nothing towards her 
educational expenses. (Tr. 29) 
33. The only retirement Mrs. Johnson has is a matching fund 
through her employer, but to be eligible she must withhold no less 
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than 1% and not more than 17%. (Tr. 31) Mrs. Johnson has withheld 
the minimum of 1%. (Tr. 31) She doesn't withhold more because she 
is unable to afford more. (Tr. 32) 
34. Mrs. Johnson an account with Oppenheimer with $7,784.00 in 
it. (Tr. 25-26, 32) However, this money has been slowly set aside 
by Mrs. Johnson over the years since the divorce in order to be 
able to pay Mr. Johnson his $8,500.00 equity lien in the family 
home at the time the last child turns 18 in May of 1997. (Tr. 26) 
35. There were questions about the possible value of the home, 
and Mrs. Johnson had put in her Financial Declaration that she 
thought the home was worth about $85,000.00 (R. 191), but she 
testified that she really had no sound idea of how much the home 
was worth, and in fact felt that there was a question as to how 
much the home was worth due to the deterioration of the property. 
(Tr. 27) I 
36. She testified that she would need to be spending about 
$200.00 per month into maintenance in the home, but has in fact put 
nothing into a fund or into actual home maintenance due to a lack 
of funds. (Tr. 27) 
37. Mrs. Johnson's monthly expenses at the time of trial were 
approximately $1,824.00 as set forth in her Financial Declaration. 
(R. 189) This was the finding of the District Court. (R. 259) 
38. She has two other small accounts but those are her 
checking account and an account for taxes. (Tr. 32) Those amounts 
are insignificant in any event. (R. 189) 
39. Mrs. Johnson is supposed to pay estimated taxes to the 
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Internal Revenue Service on her beauty salon income, but is unable 
to do so due to a lack of money. (Tr. 33) 
40. Mrs. Johnson testified that in her opinion the alimony 
amount of $550.00 was necessary for her to pay her living expenses, 
and so informed Mr. Johnson during their prior conversation in late 
1994. (Tr. 36) She has found that her ability to pay her basic 
subsistence expenses has diminished since Mr. Johnson quit making 
alimony payments. (Tr. 41-42) 
41. Mrs. Johnson testified that she never agreed at any time 
to terminate the alimony, either with Mr. Johnson or with his 
attorney. (Tr. 36) 
42. When Mr. Johnson unilaterally ceased making alimony 
payments Mrs. Johnson was not able to subsist on her income from 
her job and her beauty shop. (Tr. 38) 
43. Mrs. Johnson has found it necessary to supplement her 
income through assistance from neighbors, her church, and her 
family. (Tr. 38) For example, on her birthday she was given a box 
of meat by her mother and sister because they can't afford meat. 
She makes the box last for about 6 months. (Tr. 38) 
44. At Christmas of 1995 she received an anonymous letter with 
$100.00 in it at her employment, which was used to buy Christmas 
needs. 
45. For Christmases of 1994 and 1995 Mrs. Johnson's church 
also provided her with food and money. 
46. Since the time of the divorce the only clothing that Mrs. 
Johnson has been able to buy for herself has been one inexpensive 
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dress. (Tr. 39) 
47. Some used clothing has been given to her by friends, but 
for all intents and purposes the clothing Mrs. Johnson wears today 
is the same clothing she owned prior to the divorce. (Tr. 39-40) 
She is in need of new clothing for her job, but to date has had to 
make use of clothing that is rapidly wearing out. (Tr. 56) 
48. Mrs. Johnson qualifies for the Circuit Breaker program, 
which provides tax relief by means of paying property taxes for 
indigents. Last year they paid $300.00 towards Mrs. Johnson's 
property taxes. (Tr. 40) 
49. Marilyn, the minor child living with Mrs. Johnson, 
receives free lunches at her high school due to Mrs. Johnson's low 
income. (Tr. 41) 
50. Mrs. Johnson is unable to provide clothing, entertainment 
money and some other necessary expenses for the minor child, which 
has necessitated that the minor child obtain a job, which she uses 
to buy clothes, school supplies, and the like. (Tr. 41) 
51. Mrs. Johnson's washing machine broke down last year and 
her church paid to have it repaired, but in the meantime she had to 
use a scrub board and bucket to do her laundry for a period of 
about five weeks. (Tr. 42) 
52. She has a dishwasher in the home, but it doesn't work(Tr. 
42-43) , her sewing machine is broken (Tr. 46) , and she has to 
borrow a vacuum cleaner from a neighbor because hers is broken (Tr. 
52) . 
53. She has been the recipient of anonymous gifts and money, 
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food, and clothing have been furnished by friends and neighbors. 
(Tr. 43-44) 
54. The condition of the home in which Mrs. Johnson and her 
child live is deteriorating, and many items are broken or in a 
dilapidated condition. Many of the curtains are sun rotted (Tr. 
44) ; the legs on the couch are broken (Tr. -46) ; the closet doors 
in the bedrooms don't work or are broken (Tr. 46); her bed frame 
is broken and her bed is on the floor (Tr. 46); the plumbing and 
other items associated with her beauty salon are either not up to 
code, are broken or deteriorating (Tr. 48-49); the back deck is 
substantially deteriorated (Tr. 49). 
55. Mrs. Johnson does not have the funds to make repairs to 
the home and in her opinion the continuing deterioration of the 
home is affecting the fair market value of the home. (Tr. 49-50) 
56. Mrs. Johnson and the child for their meals eat a lot of 
rice, macaroni, potatoes and the like. They are unable to afford 
much in the way of fruits and vegetables. (Tr. 52) 
57. Mrs. Johnson is not able to take vacations or trips and 
enjoys very little in the way of recreation. (Tr. 50) 
58. Prior to the divorce Mrs. Johnson had her own car, had 
plenty of money to eat well, went on a variety of trips, they ate 
out often, belonged to a dinner club, went to movies and 
participated in a variety of recreational and entertainment 
oriented activities, had nice clothes, and the children had 
opportunities to travel and participate in a variety of activities. 
(Tr. 50-51) 
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59. For Mrs. Johnson to live in the way she does is 
humiliating to her. (tr. 56) 
60. Mrs. Johnson was able to only pay a small portion of her 
attorney's fees for the trial of this matter and nothing has 
changed since then and Mr. Johnson is in a superior position to pay 
and should be ordered to pay Mrs. Johnson's costs and fees for this 
appeal. (Tr. 54; Ex. 8) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The appellant has failed to marshal his evidence as 
required by this court. 
2. No contract was ever entered into between the parties to 
either terminate or reduce the alimony payments. 
3. There has been no substantial change in circumstances 
warranting a modification. 
4. Even if there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances warranting the court to examine the conditions of the 
parties, the financial situations of the parties do not warrant a 
modification of the alimony amount. 
5. The District Court in the Decree of Divorce did not intend 
that the alimony only last for the time it took Mrs. Johnson to 
obtain a bachelors degree from the University of Utah. 
6. The award of attorney's fees in the amount of $1,500.00 for 
Mrs. Johnson and against Mr. Johnson was fair and reasonable. 
7. Mr. Johnson should be ordered to pay Mrs. Johnson's 
attorney's fees and costs for this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
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POINT I; 
THE APPELLANT HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT 
OF HIS POSITION IN THIS APPEAL. 
In a large variety of cases our appellate courts have 
repeatedly required an appealing party to marshal the evidence. 
For example, in Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exchange, 817 P2d 789 (Ut. 
1991) , at 799, the court held that where a party challenges a lower 
court ruling that party " . . . must marsha the evidence in support 
of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the 
verdict." 
The court then went on to observe that the appealing party " 
11
. . . . has made no attempt to marshal the evidence in 
support of the jury finding of fraud. In fact, all 
Fire Insurance has done is argue selected evidence favorable 
to its position. That does not begin to meet the marshalling 
burden it must carry. We do not sit to retry the facts." 
Mr. Johnson's brief has done the same thing. He has merely 
selected certain facts or interpretations of facts that he believes 
supports his position, all the while ignoring all of the other 
facts in the case. Obviously the District Court made its decision 
based upon facts other than those argued by the appellant. 
Therefore, the factual arguments of Mr. Johnson should be 
overlooked and this court should only be concerned with determining 
whether the law has been correctly applied to the facts, and those 
facts to be accepted by this court must be those as found by the 
District Court in its Findings of Fact. Since Mr. Johnson has made 
no real attack on the law as it was applied to the facts the 
decision should be affirmed. 
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POINT II: 
NO ACCORD AND SATISFACTION OR OTHER FORM OF AGREEMENT 
WAS CREATED BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO EITHER REDUCE OR 
ELIMINATE THE ALIMONY. j 
In the appellant's petition to modify the Decree of Divorce 
(R. 175) he essentially argues an accord and satisfaction was 
created between the parties to eliminate entirely his alimony 
obligation to Mrs. Johnson. We submit that no such agreement was 
ever reached for the following reasons: 
1. From the Financial Declaration, the testimony and other 
data, it is clear that Mrs. Johnson and the child were living in a 
semi-impoverished state since the Decree, that at the time of the 
alleged discussions about alimony she was not employed, and then 
became employed but was on a probation status for 90 days. All 
this time Mr. Johnson was living very comfortably. Why would Mrs. 
Johnson give up $550.00 per month for no reason when that money was 
so desperately needed. To agree to such a thing makes no sense. 
2. Mr. Johnson alleges that an agreement was reached between 
the parties in October of 1994 to terminate the alimony after she 
found employment. She did not find employment until that following 
February. Mrs. Johnson has adamantly denied that any such 
agreement was ever reached by the parties or even seriously 
discussed as far as she was concerned. Mr. Johnson was undoubtedly 
serious about wanting the alimony dropped, but Mrs. Johnson was 
equally serious about wanting it to continue. 
Our appellate courts have repeatedly held that an accord and 
satisfaction is a contractual arrangement, it must contain all of 
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the elements of a valid contract, and is governed by the las 
dealing with contracts. Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, 611 
P2d 705 (Utah, 1971) . The rules pertaining to such a situation 
dictate that an accord and satisfaction is used to discharge a 
prior obligation and as a result it is an absolute necessity that 
new consideration be given. (Id.) In our case we have no elements 
of a contract extant in the dealings between the parties. There is 
a total lack of any type of consideration. If Mr. Johnson insists 
that a contract was created, what were its terms, and where is the 
consideration he is giving his former wife to warrant her loss of 
$550.00 per month in alimony. 
3. We further submit that there was never a meeting of the 
minds on the matter. Exhibit P-9 is a memorandum Mrs. Johnson made 
immediately after a telephone call between her and Mr. Johnson on 
March 18, 1995. In this writing she summarizes the content of that 
conversation, well after the date of the alleged agreement between 
them. It is evident there was no agreement at the time alleged by 
Mr. Johnson to eliminate any alimony or otherwise modify the 
Decree. The discussions between her and counsel for Mr. Johnson 
produced nothing either. These were initiated by counsel and/or 
Mr. Johnson and not by Mrs. Johnson. 
As the District Court found in its Findings of Fact, there was 
some discussion about modifying the Decree but there was clearly 
never any agreement reached by the parties. 
4. Our courts have held that an accord and satisfaction may 
pertain to any type of obligation or theory of recovery, and, that 
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the party alleging the accord and satisfaction has the burden of 
proving its elements. Bennion v. LeGrand Johnson Const. Co., 701 
P2d 1078 (Utah, 1985). Nothing present in the record provide any 
evidence that any of the elements of an accord and satisfaction 
have been met. The appellant should therefore not prevail on this 
point. 
We think that the District Court's finding on this matter well 
summarizes our point, The court found as follows: 
"There is evidence that the parties discussed alimony 
termination, but there is no evidence that there was 
ever a meeting of the minds on any terms of an agreement 
to terminate. Although offers and counteroffers were 
made over a period of time there was never an agreement 
reached nor any offer accepted by either party." (R. 261, 
#18.) 
POINT III 
IT WAS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE DISTRICT COURT IN THE 
DECREE OF DIVORCE TO ELIMINATE ALIMONY WHEN MRS. JOHNSON 
COMPLETED HER SCHOOLING, BUT RATHER, ONLY INDICATED THAT 
MR. JOHNSON WOULD BE FREE TO PETITION THE COURT TO CONSIDER 
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECREE SHOULD BE MODIFIED. 
This court is well aware that he purpose of alimony is to 
"enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as possible the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent the 
spouse from becoming a public charge." Eames v. Eamesf 735 P2d 
395, at 397 (Utah App. 1987) Mrs. Johnson was married to the 
appellant for over 24 years, bore him three children, and worked in 
the home as a homemaker rearing the children for the entire term of 
the marriage. She had a high school degree and no advanced 
training. Mr. Johnson has argued that the alimony should be 
eliminated because that was the intent of the trial judge, i.e., 
17 
that the alimony should be rehabilitative only, and last for a 
limited period of time. However, the Decree states no such thing, 
but merely states the right of Mr. Johnson to bring the matter 
before the court to show a change in circumstances warranting an 
elimination of the alimony, which he was allowed to do if she did 
not attend school or if she did attend school and graduated. The 
wording in the Decree is not some type of preapproved elimination 
of alimony. This is exactly the situation in Olson v. Olson, 704 
P2d 564 (Utah, 1985), where the court was faced with circumstances 
where the wife was a high school graduate and had spent the 
majority of the marriage bearing and rearing the parties' children. 
The court held that a limitation of the alimony after two years 
time, during which the wife was to obtain further education and 
training, was an abuse of discretion, with the result that the 
appellate court made the alimony award of $1,600.00 per month 
permanent, rather than allowing it to be limited to a particular 
period of time. 
In the instant case the wording in the Decree in fact doesn't 
make a lot of sense. Mrs. Johnson could easily have quit school or 
never started due to the extreme financial burdens she faced, in 
which event Mr. Johnson supposedly had the right to come in and ask 
the court to modify the decree. Under Mr. Johnson's interpretation 
of the Decree Mrs. Johnson could have been left without alimony 
within months after the divorce. It was only through a herculean 
effort that she was able to complete her schooling. The alimony 
should be something she is entitled to regardless of her 
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educational pursuits or accomplishments. 
In Martinez v. Martinez, 754 P2d 69 (Utah App. 1988) the court 
was faced with a similar situation and again struck down a limited, 
rehabilitative alimony, stating that even if the wife did obtain 
further education, there was no l!. . . reasonable expectation of 
obtaining employment two years hence that will enable her to 
support herself at a standard of living even approaching that which 
she enjoyed during the marriage." (Ibid, at 75) [Emphasis added] 
We submit that Judge Moffat's intent was not to create a short term 
alimony award, but if it was he was in error in doing so. 
In Andersen v. Andersen, 757 P2d 476, 478-479 (Utah App. 
1988), the district court had awarded the plaintiff $300.00 per 
month alimony until she completed her schooling or became employed 
full-time. "The court found that defendant would have only $843 
per month from which to pay the $300 per month alimony and his own 
living expenses, while plaintiff would have $300 per month alimony 
and $200 per month earnings and no rent payments." This is much 
different than the instant action where Mr. Johnson's income is 
substantially greater than Mrs. Johnson's income. 
| The court in Andersen, after citing a number of similar cases, 
and the reasons for alimony, stated that " . . . we agree with 
plaintiff that the court abused its discretion in terminating her 
alimony when she completes her schooling or becomes employed full 
time, " citing the Jones case in which the court found 
rehabilitative alimony to be inequitable. (Id.) The court went on 
to rule as follows: 
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"As in Jones and Olson, plaintiff is in her 50's, has 
spent most of her life providing services to her family 
with no remuneration, and has minimal work experience. 
Given that lack of work experience she cannot be expected 
to immediately find a job upon completing of her schooling. 
Also, her salary when she does find employment is unknown. 
The speculative nature of her future was corroborated during 
appellant argument when counsel represented that plaintiff 
had completed school, her alimony had terminated and she 
had not found employment. Under the facts in this case, the 
court's order terminating plaintiff's alimony upon completion 
of her schooling without requiring proof that her financial 
circumstances had materially changed is an abuse of 
discretion and places an unwarranted burden on plaintiff." 
(Id.) 
We think it is important to recognize that it was foreseeable 
by the District Court in the original divorce proceedings that Mrs. 
Johnson would complete her income and improve upon her $110.00 per 
month income from her beauty shop. Yet knowing this the court did 
not decree that alimony automatically terminate upon the completion 
of her education. It was also foreseeable that Mrs. Johnson may 
not have been able to afford schooling and would have had to find 
other employment, yet the court did not order the alimony to 
terminate automatically upon the occurrence of those circumstances. 
All the court did was tell Mr. Johnson when the earliest date was 
that he could bring a petition to modify if he thought 
circumstances warranted it. 
POINT IV: 
THERE HAS BEEN NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES 
WARRANTING THE COURT TO EXAMINE OTHER FACTORS AND MODIFY 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE. 
It is well established that a party must first show that there 
has been a substantial change in circumstances before the court is 
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allowed to exercise its equity powers to determine whether or not 
the original Decree should be modified. [See, e.g., Hogge v. Hogge, 
649 P2d 51 (Utah, 1982)] We must examine now whether Mr. Johnson 
has met that burden. 
The parties were divorce in October of 1990 after over 24 
years of marriage. The Findings of Fact in the original hearing 
found that for purposes of determining child support and alimony 
the (defendant's average monthly income, as projected by his 
employer, would be $3,100.00. It is difficult to see how this 
could have been the projected income since he received a total 
income of $60,478.00 for that year before he deducted from that 
amount alimony to Mrs. Johnson of $2,690.00 and his IRA deduction 
of $2,000.00, for an adjusted gross of $55,788.00. (Ex. P-2) 
The District Court in this proceeding found his income after taxes 
to be $2,600.00, (R. 260) and his monthly income to be $3,800.00. 
(R. 260) His expenses, including child support, were found to be 
$2,083.00. (R. 260) As for Mr. Johnson, there is also the matter 
of the woman with whom he is living. 
The district court made no specific findings on that matter, 
but we submit that his testimony that he lives with a woman with a 
full time job who contributes essentially nothing to their living 
expenses and entertainment to be totally unbelievable. He 
testified that he had no idea what her income was (also 
incredible), and that he paid for virtually all of the expenses. 
Where does her money go?? It is obvious to everyone that this 
woman does contribute to the household income, and if she doesn't 
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then Mr. Johnson has more money than he is telling us, and his 
generosity is great, but very misplaced. If he wishes to be so 
generous then he can share than generosity with his former with of 
24 years who bore and raised his three children, rather than 
expending his largess on some live-in girl friend who supposedly 
freeloads off him. This whole scenario is ludicrous. 
We submit that the truth of the matter is that this woman does 
contribute to the household income, that Mr. Johnson was not 
telling the truth about this, and that he thus enjoys the benefit 
of a second relatively substantial income in his home. 
Mrs. Johnson's income from her job, after taxes, was found to 
be $1,083.82, her child support is $294.00, and her gross income 
from her shop is $200.00 per month. (R. 259) Her living expenses 
were found to be $1,824.00 per month, which leaves her short 
approximately $250.00 per month in meeting her basic expense needs. 
(R. 250) 
Her income from alimony, her token shop income and child 
support at the time of the divorce was $1,048.79. We fail to see 
that this amount is significantly different from her current 
income. In either case she is still short of meeting basic 
subsistence level expenses. In short, Mr. Johnson's income has 
increased more than Mrs. Johnson's has since the divorce. 
On page 14 of Mr. Johnson's brief he makes various arguments 
fraught with error. To begin with, he asserts that Mr. Johnson 
earned $3,100.00 at the time of the divorce. (If we consider the 
court's findings to be accurate at that time that is true. 
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However, his reported income for that year on his income tax return 
showed an income considerably higher. We cannot help but believe 
that his evidence regarding his projected income for that year was 
grossly in error.) Be that as it may, his income was $3,100.00. 
They then argue that his current income is $2,600.00. They do 
state that one is gross income and the other net, but we must 
emphasize that the figures they set forth are a gross figure for 
the date of the divorce and a net figure currently. In addition, 
at the time of the divorce Mr. Johnson was paying child support for 
two children and Mrs. Johnson was receiving that money, amounted to 
$588.00 per month. 
The appellant's portrayal of Mrs. Johnson's income being only 
$110.00 at the time of the divorce and $1,283.00 now is grossly 
misleading and unfair. At the time of the divorce Mrs. Johnson was 
receiving the child support of $588.00, plus the $110.00, plus 
alimony of $350.00 per month, for a total of $1.048.00. Mr. 
Johnson quit paying alimony when he thought he had paid enough, one 
of the children reached her majority, and the third child will 
reach 18 next spring, leaving her with the current income from her 
job, plus something in the area of $200.00 GROSS from her hair 
salon. And that is if she is able to keep it operating, which 
given the circumstances is highly questionable, both from a 
practical standpoint since her job now consumes much of her time 
leaving her less time to work in her salon (R.90), as well as 
legally, since the license for her business may not be renewed if 
she cannot correct certain plumbing and other defects. (R. 48-49) 
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Thus, the $200.00 they show as part of her net income is in fact 
gross income and is in jeopardy. 
We are clearly not talking about a 1066% change in 
circumstances. If the appellant picks and chooses as he has done 
he could come up with any percentage of increase. But the facts 
are different from what he has represented them to be. The truth 
of the matter is that Mrs. Johnson's income has experienced an 
increase, but substantially less than they represent, and one which 
we submit is not substantial enough to cut her off from her alimony 
payment. With the alimony income and the child support for the 
next few months she would be able to catch up a little, and when 
the child support disappears her income would only be about $500.00 
more than she had before, which still leaves her in a very tight 
financial situation. 
We further submit to this court that the original amount of 
income that Mrs. Johnson had was woefully inadequate. The alimony 
will improve her situation a bit, but she is hardly going to live 
lavishly on her income from both job and alimony. It is a wonder 
Mrs. Johnson has made it as long as she has. To take away her 
alimony would only serve to penalize her for working hard to obtain 
a degree and a job. It will also only accelerate and perpetuate her 
decline deeper into poverty. 
Mr. Johnson next argues that Mrs. Johnson has accumulated 
$9,184.00 in savings. Actually this is in error. The amount in her 
Oppenheimer account is $7,077.06 (R. 190), and Mrs. Johnson 
testified that this is money she has painstakingly scraped together 
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the last few years to pay Mr. Johnson his $8,500.00 lien amount in 
the home when the youngest child reaches eighteen next year in 
order to avoid losing her home. The other meager amount of $257.15 
is for her taxes, but that is inadequate to meet that need. (Tr. 
32/ R. 190) The other amount of over a thousand is a fluctuating 
amount that is in her checking account that she uses to pay her 
monthly expenses. That is obviously an account that could go from 
zero to a larger amount on payday. Thus, their representation of 
her having over $9,000.00 in disposable and available cash is 
grossly misleading and ignores completely the testimony and facts 
surrounding the purposes of these amounts. 
They next argue that Mrs. Johnson's circumstances have 
changed because they claim she has $70,600.00 equity in her home. 
This is based upon Mrs. Johnson's Financial Declaration (R. 191) 
where she sets the value of her home at $85,000.00. However, this 
amount would seem suspect since it is based upon the information 
given by her in her Financial Declaration and is not really based 
upon testimony in court that is based upon proper foundation. It 
is admitted that a homeowner can testify as to their value of their 
home, but even they must establish some foundation to qualify to 
testify. The result is that her statement is more speculation than 
anything. 
However, if we consider that her estimate of value is correct, 
the major flaw in Mr. Johnson's testimony is his assertion that she 
has over $70,000.00 available to her to live on and thus has 
considerable wealth far and above that of Mr. Johnson. This 
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argument has several problems. 
First, we must conclude that the Decree of Divorce made an 
equitable division of the property of the parties and that if Mrs. 
Johnson received the equity in the home, Mr. Johnson likewise 
received his fair share of equity plus other property that made the 
division- fair and equitable. If we say that she should resort to 
her equity to support herself then why not ask Mr. Johnson to look 
to his assets from the marriage to pay alimony. 
Next, equity in a home is meaningless unless the home is sold. 
Until that time it is merely the home and residence of a family or 
individual. These repeated arguments that a home is worth so much 
because of its equity is pointless since that amount only 
materializes if the home is sold. If Mrs. Johnson were to sell her 
home where would she live, what would be the costs, how long would 
the money last, and in the overall scheme of things how would this 
money benefit her? It is apparent that all this would do is put 
her out of her home and into a rental property where the available 
funds would dwindle until she no longer had either a home or 
equity. 
As the court noted in its Findings, Mr. Johnson offered 
absolutely no evidence as to what would be accomplished under such 
an idea, or how it would work. Mr. Johnson did not say if she 
could obtain a second mortgage, whether she could afford the second 
mortgage payments, whether she could even qualify for such a loan, 
and whether a sale or second mortgage would ameliorate her 
situation or further cause it to deteriorate. He presented no 
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evidence of any kind on this concept of asking her to liquidate her 
equity in her home. As the court noted in its Findings (R. 260-
261) "Defendant has asked the court to speculate as to the effects 
of refinancing the home and other avenues of relief through 
obtaining loans by plaintiff, but no evidence has been presented to 
support any finding in defendant's favor, or that such avenues 
would provide any relief to the plaintiff." 
We therefore submit that considering such information does 
nothing to further Mr. Johnson's argument that there has been a 
substantial change in circumstances. The Haslam case that they 
cite is based upon much different circumstances and really does not 
support the relief they seek. It is far from being identical. 
POINT V: 
EVEN IF THE COURT WERE TO FIND THAT THERE HAS BEEN A 
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES THE COURT MUST STILL 
FIND THAT CIRCUMSTANCES WARRANT A MODIFICATION, WHICH WE 
SUBMIT THEYDO NOT. 
The appellant wants to make this point one purely of 
mathematics. They argue that her expenses exceed her income only 
by $250.00 and that as a result she should at best only be entitled 
to $250.00 per month as alimony. This is an odd argument since 
they are admitting that her expenses exceed her income yet they 
claim she is entitled to no alimony. They then resort to a 
reargument of the substantial assets position alleging that the 
court ignored the equity in her home and the money in her savings. 
We feel we have adequately dealt with these arguments above. 
In support of this position they cite certain cases that they 
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believe require only three grounds for alimony. However, these are 
not correctly cited since these and many other cases require that 
alimony "enable the receiving spouse to maintain as nearly as 
possible the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage and to 
prevent the spouse from becoming a public charge." Eames v. Eames, 
735 P2d 395, at 397 (Utah App. 1987) . Mrs. Johnson was married to 
the defendant for over 24 years, bore him three children, and 
worked in the home as a homemaker and rearing the children for the 
entire term of the marriage. She had a high school education and 
no advanced training. 
Let us look at what the testimony has revealed about Mrs. 
Johnson's living standard: 
1. Circuit Breaker Property Tax Relief Program. 
2. Utah State Department of Rehabilitation: She qualified for 
some assistance with books, career counseling and some tuition from 
the State of Utah while obtaining her degree. The rest she paid 
for herself. 
3. School Lunch Program: She has an income that qualifies her 
daughter for free school lunches. 
4. Her LDS ward has contributed over the past years Christmas 
gifts, cash, food, money to repair her washer while she used a 
scrub board and bucket to clean her laundry. No money here for 
laundromats. 
5. Family assistance: Her birthday and Christmas gifts from 
family have been boxes filled with meat and poultry. they have 
given other items of food. 
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6. Anonymous cash gifts and gifts of clothing from co-workers. 
7. The condition of the home is bad and getting worse in many 
ways. Mrs. Johnson's bed frame is broken so her mattress is on the 
floor. 
8. Friends and Neighbors: They share their newspapers and 
store coupons with Mrs. Johnson. They have given produce, bread, 
and other grocery items, as well as anonymous gift donations. 
9. Mr. Johnson has an equitable interest in the home, but has 
done nothing to help maintain the home. 
10. Her.vacuum cleaner, sewing machine and dishwasher are 
broken. her washing machine and clothes dryer appear to be on 
their last leg. (Tr. 55) 
11. She lacks adequate money to purchase birthday, Christmas 
and other types of gifts. Mr. Johnson on the other hand is able to 
provide his children with various gifts and trips. 
12. The family lacks adequate funding for entertainment. 
13. Mrs. Johnson has had virtually no new clothes since the 
divorce. 
POINT VI: 
THE ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDED WERE WARRANTED, FAIR AND 
REASONABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE. 
Mr. Johnson in his brief criticizes Mrs. Johnson's counsel for 
having spent 13 hours on a memorandum for the pre-trial settlement 
conference. Counsel has never been criticized before for being 
well prepared. It was hoped that if the court were well apprised 
of the law and facts in the case the chances of a settlement would 
be increased, which would relieve the substantial burden of trial 
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costs on Mrs. Johnson. When that failed that same memorandum 
served as the Trial Memorandum, and has provided data for 
preparation of this brief. It would seem to have been well worth 
the time, particularly when one considers that (a) she is only 
being billed at $80.00 per hour and (b) the earned and billed fee 
was $2,480 but she was awarded only $1,500. 
CONCLUSION 
1. The Judgment and Decree should be affirmed in total, 
including the back amounts of alimony to be paid by Mr. Johnson due 
to his unilateral termination of the payment of alimony, plus the 
ruling maintaining the alimony at the current level. 
2. Mrs. Johnson should be awarded her attorney's fees incurred 
for the preparation of this reply brief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of December, 1996. 
GREGORY B. WALL 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee 
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